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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, herein referred to as 
plaintiffs, filed an action in the District Court for a 
Declaratory Judgment seeking a ruling from the Court that they 
were entitled to cross Defendant-Respondent, herein referred 
to as defendant's property in order to reach property then 
owned by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further sought a 
permanent restraining order preventing the defendant from 
barracading or interferring with plaintiff's access. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendant 
moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint. The Court took the 
motion under advisement and after defendant presented his 
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evidence, the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs on appeal seek reversal of the trial 
court's decision and a permanent restraining order preventing 
the defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' access across 
defendant's property to allow plaintiffs access to their 
forty acre parcel, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of the plaintiffs are owners of a parcel of 
real property located in Summit County within Section 34, 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East. The plaintiffs George Q. 
Nielsen and Sherry Nielsen acquired title to their property 
from Ethel Gibbons by Warranty Deed in 1962. The other 
plaintiffs acquired title by conveyance from George Q. Nielsen 
and Sherry Nielsen. The ownership of the property was 
stipulated by counsel (T.3, 63). 
Ethel Gibbons and her family owned the property for 
a long period of time. Alma Gibbons was deeded the property 
by the State of Utah in 1914, (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 9). 
The property was deeded subject to any easement or right of 
way of the public, even at that time. 
Ethel Gibbons acquired the property from her family 
in 1935, and continued ownership until 1962, when she conveyed 
the property to George Q. Nielsen. During her lifetime, the 
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only means of getting to the property was over what she and 
her family had called "Shingle Mill Canyon Road". (R-ll), 
(T-63). For a period of over forty years, she and her family 
used the roadway to the property as a matter of right. (R-ll). 
In 1938, Virgil Smith, a resident of Summit County, 
used the property for logging and used an established roadway 
across the Curt Wilde property to remove the logs. Curt Wilde 
later became the grantor of the defendant herein. (R-13). 
The Pines Ranch originally consisted of 160 acres, 
four 40-acre parcels. They were acquired from the original 
homesteader, a Mr. Pyrie. They ran in an east-west direction, 
parallel to the river and the roadway. (T-81). 
Thereafter, the defendant acquired three more 40-acre 
parcels along the west fence line and an additional 40-acre 
parcel from Curt Wilde. These purchases were made in 1961, and 
1964. (T83 and T102-103). 
George Q. Nielsen purchased the 40-acre parcel in 
question from Ethel Gibbons in 1962, and used the roadway to 
reach his property. (T-9) He used the property for logging, 
recreation, removal of Christmas trees, hiking, etc. 
Subsequently in 1964, the defendant purchased one more 
40-acre parcel from the Gibbons estate headed by Albert Gibbons. 
This transaction gave the defendant ownership of all of Section 34, 
with the exception of that property owned by the plaintiffs herein. 
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Shortly before this lawsuit was filed, the defendant 
began interfering with plaintiffs1 access to the property, 
and the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT USE OF THE RIGHT 
OF WAY BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS WAS 
PERMISSIVE, 
The clear and undisputed testimony is that the plaintiffs, 
their predecessors, and other persons used the contested right of way 
for nearly a half century, commencing in 1938. (Rll-13). 
The defendant acquired the property surrounding the 
property of the plaintiff, from Mr. Curt Wilde. Mr. Rogerson 
testified that he believed the purchase was made in 1957. (T-83) 
But on the cross examination he identified the deed from Mr. Curt 
Wilde to Pines Ranch, dated September 7, 1961. (T102-103). And 
the last 4 0 acre parcel was purchased by the defendants from the 
Gibbons estate in 1964. (T-83). 
The Court found that in "recent years" the use by the 
plaintiffs became permissive because defendant has made every" 
attempt to keep people from trespassing. (R-32, paragraph 2)• 
In Utah, the period of time required to acquire a 
prescriptive right is twenty (20) years, so said this Court in 
Cassity v. Castigano, 10 Utah 2d 16, 347 P. 2d 834. That 
principle is so clearly established that it does not deserve 
further attention here. 
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It is clear that the prescriptive rights were 
established very early by the plaintiffs1 predecessor in 
interest, Ethel Gibbons. Any permissiveness on the part of 
defendant in recent years would not affect or upset prescrip-
tive rights already acquired by the plaintiffs or their 
predecessors in interest. (See Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 
175 P. 2d 714.) 
The plaintiffs believe the instant situation is governed 
by this Court's decision in Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 
P. 2d 314, where the Court speaking of the fundamental principles 
applicable to prescriptive rights, said: 
"The origin and purpose of their recognition arises out 
of the general policy of the law of assuring the peace 
and good order of society by leaving a long established 
status quo at rest rather than by disturbing it. 
In order to serve this purpose, when a claimant has 
shown that such a use has existed peaceably and without 
interference for the prescriptive period of 20 years, 
the law presumes that the use is adverse to the owner; 
and that it had a legitimate origin. The latter 
presumption is usually placed on the ground that there 
was a lawful grant of such right, but that it had been 
lost. It is appreciated that this lost grant theory is 
fictional. But the theory upon which the presumption 
rests is not important. Whatever theory it may be based 
based upon, what is significant is that it has a well 
justified and salutary purpose which is in conformity 
with the policy just discussed; and that it is so well 
established in our law that its validity is no longer 
open to question. Consequently it should be given 
effect to prevent the very thing which defendants have 
attempted here; the upsetting of a situation which has 
existed amicably since "the memory of man runneth not 
to the contrary." 
(emphasis added) 
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The Court further made clear the burden of the parties 
in this kind of case. Where the claimant has shown that such 
use has existed peaceably and without interference for twenty 
(20) years, the law presumes that its use is adverse to the 
owner and that it had a legitimate origin. The plaintiffs 
herein have clearly shown the use commencing in 1935, without 
any interference whatever until the time this lawsuit was 
commenced, and the defendant herein had no standing to complain 
about crossing the Curt Wilde property until 1961, when the 
Wilde property was acquired by them. 
The Court in Richins also stated, 
"The presumption above mentioned that a use is 
adverse which arises from its continuance for a 
long period of time is not absolute. It would 
not preclude the owner of the servient estate, 
(defendant herein), from proving that the use 
was by permission. If he sustains that burden 
and overcomes the presumption of proof that the 
use was initially permissive, then the burden 
of going forward with the evidence and of 
ultimate persuasion shifts back to the claimant 
to show that the use became adverse and continued 
for the prescriptive period." 
The Court made clear that the reason for this rule was 
to insure that a claimant would not "sneak up" on the owner 
by using his property under permission and thereafter claim the 
use as a matter of right. It is abundantly clear in this 
situation that the initial use and continued use from the date 
Ethel Gibbons acquired the property in 19 35, and until this action 
was filed in 1974, that the use was claimed as a matter of right 
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and certainly could not have been permissive with the defendant 
herein because defendant had no ownership interest until 1961. 
The record is replete with evidence and admissions 
by the defendants witnesses that the roadway was used by Curt 
Wilde, by the Stevens and other people, and there is absolutely 
no evidence in the record that anyone was ever denied access 
across defendant's property until the neighbors started sub-
dividing their property. Counsel for the defendant asked 
Rogerson on direct examination whether or not prior to 1964 
or 1965, they had "no trespassing" signs posted on their 
gate, to which he responded, "I don't remember specifically". 
(T-92) 
The only direct evidence of blocking out the plaintiffs, 
or other persons, was made by one of the defense witnesses, 
Scott M. Matheson, who testified very precisely that he acquired 
some of the real property on June 22, 1971. (T-66). And he 
installed a chain and padlock over the roadway in question on 
the 4th day of October, 1975. (T-69). Until that time there 
is no evidence that the plaintiffs were deprived access to the 
property, and there is no evidence, with the exception of the 
short statement by Mr. Rogerson, that sometime in 1962, 1963, 
or 1965, he told the plaintiff Mr. Nielsen that he was trespassing 
on the property, while cutting Christmas trees. (T-109). The 
conversation was denied by Mr. Nielsen. (T-117). 
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Mr. Rogerson admitted at trial that Albert Gibbons, 
his grantor, used the property for lumbering, and took the 
lumber down the Wilde road. (T-105) 
The clear and undisputed testimony is that the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors and other persons used the contested 
right of way for nearly half a century, commencing in 1938. (Rll-13). 
This use obviously occurred before the defendant even acquired the 
Curt Wilde property, which was the property over which the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors traversed. The Curt Wilde property was not 
purchased until 1961, and the last 40 acre parcel was acquired from 
the Gibbons estate in 1964. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE USE BY THE 
PLAINTIFFS TO BE TOO SPORADIC TO ESTABLISH 
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS. 
The trial court found that the plaintiffs and their 
predecessors had used the property sporadically and said use 
had not been sufficient to require the Court to find that 
the plaintiffs or their predecessors had established an easement. 
(R-32). 
Unfortunately, the courts have not stated with precision 
the amount of use required to establish the prescriptive rights, 
but it appears clear that the legislature addressed itself to that 
question relative to adverse possession by persons claiming title 
under written instrument. UCA 78-12-9 provides, 
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by any person claiming a title 
founded upon a written instrument or a 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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been possessed and occupied in the following 
case: ... (3) where, although not inclosed, 
it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of 
fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or 
for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the 
occupant."... 
The "ordinary use of the occupant" is dictated by 
the nature of the land and the desires of the occupant. In 
Cooper v. Carter Oil Company, 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P. 2d 320, the 
court found adverse possession where the open, notorious and 
continuous use of the property consisted of grazing sheep upon 
the land for only three weeks out of the year. 
The property in question here was utilized for the 
"ordinary use" of persons who owned this kind of land. Accord-
ing to the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, (R-ll) , it was used for 
harvesting timber, grazing sheep, picnicking and other purposes. 
The affidavit of James Smith, (R-13) , indicates it was utilized 
for securing logs for building his home. It is evident from 
the plaintiffs1 Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, that the roadway was 
utilized often enough that it is plainly visible deep into the 
property, even in August, 1972, when photographs were taken. (T45) 
The very nature of the land would limit, somewhat, its 
use. There were no highways to it, it was recreational land, 
but it was used by Mr. Nielson for horseback riding, cutting timber, 
taking out Christmas trees. (T-12). Relatives of Ethel Gibbons had 
used it for harvesting the Christmas trees. (T-54) And Mr. Nielsen 
and his friends used it for hunting grouse. (T-62). Admittedly 
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the use of the property was not great because of the very 
nature of the property itself. 
However, the aerial photograph, (plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1), 
taken in 1952, shows the road very clearly indicating substant-
ial use of the access road across what is now the Pine Ranch 
property. At the time the photograph was taken, of course, the 
defendant was not the owner of the property. That portion 
designated as "Stevens Property" was owned by the Stevens, as it 
is today. The portion across the fence was owned by Curt Wilde. 
Mr. Rogerson, the chief defense witness, admitted that Mr. Wilde 
took timber from the property, that he improved the road and 
constructed a loading facility for removing timber. (T-84). 
But he stated that the roadway did not go to the Ethel Gibbons 
property. It was short by at least 100 yards, although admitted 
that there were indications of animal traffic to the plaintiff's 
property. (T-85). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CASE 
OF RICHINS V. STRUHS WAS NOT APPLICABLE. 
The facts in the Richins case, supra, are remarkably 
similar to the present case. In both cases, peaceable use of 
the easement had continued for nearly half a century. In both 
cases the use had been begun by predecessors to the present 
parties in interest. In both cases, the defendants erected a fence 
to interfere with the plaintiffs1 access to their property. In 
both cases, defendants asserted permissiveness in recent years 
as a defense to the use by the plaintiffs. And in both Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cases, the testimony as to use by the plaintiffs was undisputed, 
and finally, in both cases, the defendant's erected a fence to 
prevent access to the property. 
The principles enunciated in Richins should be applied 
to the case now before the Court. The fundamental philosophy 
of Richins is as applicable and pertinent here as it is in the 
Richins case itself. The evidence shows that the use has existed 
peaceably without interference for the prescriptive period of 
twenty years. The law presumes that the use was adverse to the 
owner, and it had a legitimate origin. There is no evidence 
to the contrary and no logical reason whatever to deny application 
of the principles in Richins to this case. 
POINT IV 
TO DENY PLAINTIFFS ACCESS TO THEIR LAND RENDERS 
THE PROPERTY WORTHLESS TO PLAINTIFFS. 
The past use of the property has been consistent with 
its mountainous terrain and character. It has been used for 
logging, Christmas tree harvesting, hunting, prospecting, 
herding sheep and recreational purposes. 
The defendant initially owned only four 40-acre parcels 
in Section 34, but gradually increased their holdings by 
purchasing additional property. They purchased the Curt Wilde 
property in 1961, which was the property over which the plaintiffs 
had traversed to gain access to their property, and in 1964, 
purchased additional property from the Gibbons estate and thereby 
completely surrounded and isolated the plaintiffs1 property. 
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In the event this court sustains the trial court's 
judgment it means, in effect, that the plaintiffs' property is 
totally inaccessible and is worthless to the owners. It amounts 
to a forfeiture to the defendants, who, incidentally, have 
utilized the property for their own purposes by allowing live-
stock to graze upon it. (T-108) 
To deny plaintiffs access is in effect to grant to the 
defendant the plaintiffs' 40-acre parcel of property. The 
nature, character and use of the property is identical. If the 
plaintiffs are isolated and cannot gain access, it amounts to 
a grant of plaintiffs' property to the defendant. 
It is interesting to note in the testimony of Mr. Rogerson, 
that at the time the defendant acquired the property, there 
was already a steel post fence running along the north boundary 
of plaintiffs' property and what is now the south boundary of the 
defendant's property. (T-91-92). Mr. Rogerson also testified that 
they, the defendants, installed a gate on the plaintiffs' property 
because their horses would get upon the plaintiffs' property and 
they had to have a convenient way to get them back. (T-108) But 
when the Gibbons' sheep strayed off what is now the plaintiffs' 
property onto the defendant's property to get water, the defendant 
brought legal action against them. (T-105). It is obvious that the 
defendant herein has taken every advantage for itself, to the 
detriment of the plaintiffs. No one can logically deny the existence 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 13 -
of the roadway across what was the Curt Wilde property into 
the area now owned by the plaintiffs. The evidence is clear 
and conclusive. The defendants embarked upon a course of 
gradually purchasing all of the property to surround that now 
owned by the plaintiffs. 
The very attitude of the defendants herein is to 
take all they can take, giving nothing in return. 
The judgment of the district court, if allowed to stand 
would be the "icing on the cake", granting to the defendant an 
additional 40 acre parcel of property which cost the plaintiffs 
$8,000.00 (Eight thousand dollars). (T-21). This is a windfall 
to which the defendants are not entitled, and a detriment or loss 
to the plaintiffs that they do not deserve. This is particularly 
true, where a continued use of the roadway would not constitute 
any substantial damage to the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs1 predecessor, Ethel Gibbons, has 
utilized the access roadway to her property in excess of forty 
(4 0) years. The defendants did not even acquire the property 
on the west to thereby isolate the plaintiffs1 property until 
1961, although there was some testimony that Mr. Rogerson 
believed the land was purchased in 1957. The roadway in 
question had been used by many people other than the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors without objection, and without interruption. 
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Stevens used it for securing his water, cattlemen used it 
for transporting cattle, and it was used for harvesting timber, 
and there is absolutely no evidence that it was used by the 
permission of the defendants. The defendants had no right to 
grant or withhold permission until 1961. They now assert that 
right over the plaintiffs and all others. It is clear that the 
time required to acquire a prescriptive right in this state is 
twenty (20) years, and that right was acquired by Ethel Gibbons 
by 1955. The use by her and her successors in interest was con-
sistent with the nature and use of the property itself and in fact, 
is the very use of the property today. True, the use was sporadic, 
but that is consistent with the nature of the land and the logical 
use by any occupant. 
All of the criteria laid down by this Court in 
acquiring prescriptive rights have been met by the plaintiffs 
herein. There is no evidence of permission given by the defendants 
herein, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to the presump-
tions enumerated in Richins. 
To hold otherwise will upset the situation which has existed 
amicably for nearly five decades and would amount to a taking of 
the property of the plaintiffs without compensation, and simply, 
giving it to the defendant, a result which is not deserved by 
either the plaintiffs or the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1976. 
RICHARD RICHARDS 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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